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The main aim of the present study was to investigate the influence of reinforced self-affirmation and 
reinforced failure on the memory misinformation effect. The misinformation effect consists in the 
witness including some incorrect details into their testimony, stemming from sources other than the 
original event. In the reinforced self-affirmation procedure, participants first recall their greatest 
achievements in life and are afterwards given a memory task with positive feedback about their 
performance on it. In a series of previous experiments, reinforced self-affirmation proved to reduce 
vulnerability to misinformation. The same result was obtained in the present study. Reinforced 
failure is a procedure not studied before, consisting in the participants recalling their greatest 
failures in life, connected with negative feedback about performance on a memory task. It was 
hypothesized that reinforced failure would increase vulnerability to misinformation. The results 
pointed to the opposite tendency – participants in the reinforced failure group performed better than 
those in the misled control group. The reduction in susceptibility to misinformation was greater in 
the reinforced self-affirmation group than in the reinforced failure one. The results are discussed in 
terms of the possibility of constructing a method of immunizing people to the misinformation effect 
available in practice for a wide community of professionals dealing with interrogations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The misinformation effect consists in the witness including information in 
their testimony that is inconsistent with a given event and stems from sources 
different from this event (Polczyk, 2007). Research into the misinformation 
effect usually involves some sort of a three-stage paradigm (Loftus, Miller,  
& Burns, 1978; Pezdek, 1977). In the first stage, the participants are presented 
with some original material; for example, they watch a video clip (Cohen & 
Harnick, 1980) or a series of slides (Loftus et al., 1978), listen to an audio 
recording (Szpitalak & Polczyk, 2010), or read a text (Hertel, Cosden, & John-
son, 1980). In the second phase, the participants are presented with some post-
event material relating to the original event, which includes some misleading 
details about it in the experimental group. The post-event material may take the 
form of a narrative describing the original event (e.g., Zaragoza & Lane, 1994), 
questions with false presuppositions (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978), an audio recor-
ding (Blank, 1998), a video clip (Itsukushima, Nishi, Maruyama, & Takahashi, 
2006), or a conversation with other witnesses (Memon & Wright, 1999). The last 
stage consists in a memory test concerning the original material. Typically, the 
number of incorrect answers consistent with misinformation on the final memory 
test is higher in the misled experimental group compared with the control one. 
The main research areas concerning the misinformation effect relate to its 
mechanisms (e.g., Blank, 1998; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Lindsay & John-
son, 1989; Polczyk, 2007; Szpitalak & Polczyk, 2011), the correlates of the ten-
dency to yield to misinformation (reviews: Polczyk, 2007; Wright & Loftus, 
1998) and the methods of reducing the tendency of witnesses to rely on misin-
formation (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 2001; Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; 
Echterhoff, Hirst & Hussy, 2005; Wright, 1993). The experiment presented in 
this article relates to the last of these areas. A procedure is presented which may 
be a basis for constructing methods reducing the influence of misinformation on 
witness testimony. So far, few such methods have been proposed. They include: 
warning against misinformation (which was not always effective; see Chambers 
& Zaragoza, 2001; Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen, 
& Toglia, 2001; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994); using the cognitive interview (also 
with inconsistent results; Holliday & Albon, 2004; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 
2010), or collaborative recall (Karns, Irvin, Suranic, & Rivardo, 2009; Ross, 
Spencer, Blatz, & Restorick, 2008). Given the scarcity of methods available for 
immunizing witnesses against misinformation and the great importance of the 
misinformation effect in real forensic situations, research concerning the 
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question of how to make people less vulnerable to misinformation seems very 
important. This is the question the present study deals with. 
Reinforced Self-Affirmation 
As a result of a series of studies by Szpitalak (2012) and Szpitalak and Pol- 
czyk (2012c), a method possibly protecting against misinformation was devel-
oped, called reinforced self-affirmation. It consists in giving an opportunity to 
self-affirm coupled with boosting the person’s self-esteem. Self-affirmation 
consisted in the participant writing down their greatest achievements in life. 
Enhancing self-esteem consisted in the participant performing a short memory 
task and being given false positive feedback about the results on this task. Thus, 
the positive self-image activated by recalling great achievements was “objec-
tively” confirmed by positive feedback from an “independent” source. The main 
premise for such a procedure was the assumption that elevated self-esteem would 
result in a tendency to rely on one’s own judgments and memories, not on infor-
mation from external sources. As a result of this, enhanced self-esteem should 
result in less tendency to give in to external influence, including the influence of 
misinformation. In a series of experiments this procedure indeed proved to re-
duce vulnerability to various forms of social influence; this effect was called the 
effect of reinforced self-affirmation (RSA); its efficacy was proven in seven 
experiments concerning the misinformation effect (Szpitalak, 2012; Szpitalak & 
Polczyk, 2012a; Szpitalak & Polczyk, 2012c), in one study into attitude change 
(Szpitalak & Polczyk, in press), and in one experiment concerning the door-in-
the-face technique (Szpitalak, Polczyk, & Cyganiewicz, under review).  
Reinforced Failure 
The main reason for doing research concerning RSA is the need for a proce-
dure useful for minimizing the tendency of witnesses to give testimonies distor-
ted as a result of misinformation. The question may arise of what is the reason 
for researching reinforced failure. Reinforced failure would take place if the self-
esteem of the witness were reduced by negative feedback coupled with the 
activation of a negative self-image. It is possible that such a situation may take 
place in a real forensic context, at least in two circumstances. First, it may 
happen that after being a witness to a crime a person may feel “bad,” for example 
because they did not help the victim. At the same time, the person may have  
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a negative opinion about the quality of their memory. The combination of these 
two elements is not far from reinforced failure.  
Second, some form of reinforced failure may take place on the witness stand. 
It is easy to imagine that the quality of a witness’s memory is being discredited, 
e.g., by lawyers, while also external “evidence” confirming the “poor quality” of 
the witness exists, e.g., in the form of better testimony of other witnesses. In all 
such situations, the questions arise of whether and to what extent the lowered 
self-esteem could make the witness more vulnerable to misinformation. 
Negative feedback, but without the lowering of self-esteem was researched 
by Szpitalak (2012) as well as Szpitalak and Polczyk (2012b). Before reading the 
post-event material, participants were engaged in a short memory task and were 
given negative feedback about their performance. It was assumed that the nega-
tive feedback would cause a threat to positive self-image (Moskowitz, 2009; 
Sedikides & Green, 2000). It was also assumed that, in order to protect their 
positive self-image, participants would engage intensively in the next part of the 
experiment in order to obtain good results and to restore the positive self-image 
in this way (Cianci, Klein, & Seijts, 2010). As this next part of the experiment 
involved post-event material, engaging in it should result in the better encoding 
of the material, including better encoding of misinformation. As a final result, 
negative feedback should lead to greater susceptibility to misinformation. This 
hypothesis was confirmed in the research by Szpitalak and Polczyk (2012b), but 
not in that by Szpitalak (2012). The meta-analysis of these results yielded  
a very small, barely significant effect in the expected direction.  
This inconsistency may have been caused by the relatively weak impact of 
negative feedback. The feedback may have been too weak to impact some 
participants, for example those with high self-esteem (Kernis, 2003), and not 
strong enough to make them engage intensively in processing the post-event 
material. Also, it is worth noting that in the experiments by Szpitalak (2012) and 
Szpitalak and Polczyk (2012a) positive feedback alone did not produce any 
significant effect; it only did so in combination with self-affirmation. It is possi-
ble that the same is the case with negative feedback – perhaps it is to weak alone, 
but may become efficient in combination with some other factors. Verifying this 
assumption was one of the aims of the present research. 
Apart from concentration on the post-event material, the second reason for 
higher susceptibility to misinformation may be lowered self-esteem resulting 
from negative feedback. This may be so because lower self-esteem may make the 
participants subjected to the reinforced failure procedure rely on external sources 
rather than on their own memory. Doubting in one’s memory was shown by 
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Blank (1998) to be one of the main reasons for yielding to misinformation in 
subjects who actually remembered the correct information but did not trust their 
own memory. Van Bergen, Horselenberg, Merckelbach, Jelicic, and Beckers 
(2010) also demonstrated that the participants who were not confident about their 
memory tended to rely on external cues – that is, on the post-event material. 
HYPOTHESES 
To sum up, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
1. The misinformation effect will occur: the number of answers consistent 
with misinformation will be higher in the misled group, compared with the con-
trol one. This hypothesis was based on existing results indicating that the misin-
formation effect is quite a powerful and replicable phenomenon. 
2. Reinforced self-affirmation effect will occur: the number of answers 
consistent with misinformation will be lower in the misled group in which RSA 
is applied than in the misled group without RSA. The main premise for this 
hypothesis has been described above: RSA should enhance self-esteem, which in 
turn should increase the tendency to rely on one’s own memory, not on the post-
event material, and therefore reduce vulnerability to the misinformation included 
in that material.  
3. Reinforced failure will result in a greater misinformation effect: The num-
ber of answers consistent with misinformation will be greater in the misled group 
in which the reinforced failure procedure is applied than in the misled group not 
subjected to this procedure. This was expected on the basis of the assumption 
that reinforced failure would lower self-esteem and would therefore increase the 
tendency to rely on external sources – in this case, on post-event material con-
taining misinformation.  
METHOD 
Participants 
One hundred and sixty-two participants (99 women and 63 men), students of 
high schools in Cracow, took part in the experiment. Their mean age was 17.19 
(SD = 1.00). The experiment was performed during school classes. The students 
were asked if they were willing to take part in a study concerning the influence 
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of an audio recording on the quality of information processing. No financial 
gratification was given for participation.  
Materials 
The following materials were used in the experiment: 
Materials concerning the misinformation effect: 
1. The original material: a six-minute audio recording on a historical event 
(details of the burial of Pharaohs in ancient Egypt). 
2. The post-event material: a narrative describing the original audio record-
ing; in the experimental group it contained eleven details inconsistent with the 
original material (details changed or added). 
3. A memory test, consisting of eleven critical questions relating to the items 
that the misleading concerned and eight filler questions. 
Materials concerning reinforced self-affirmation and reinforced failure: 
1. A list of 60 nouns to memorize. 
2. A form for writing down the nouns remembered. In the experimental 
group, the form had numbered entries that allowed the participant to realize how 
many nouns they remembered, so that they could compare their results with the 
feedback provided by the experimenter. In the control group, the form did not 
contain numbered entries but just space for writing down the nouns remembered. 
PROCEDURE 
The experiment took place during school classes in high schools. The expe-
rimenter introduced herself as a scientist from the Jagiellonian University in  
Cracow, doing research on the influence of audio material on information  
processing.  
At the beginning, participants were asked to listen to an audio recording 
about the history of ancient Egypt. Next, they were engaged in a ten-minute filler 
questionnaire. After ten minutes, one third of the participants were asked to 
describe in detail the route from their homes to school. The second third of the 
participants were asked to write down their greatest failures in life; the remaining 
third were asked to write down their greatest achievements in life. The instruc-
tions were given to participants in a written form. After three minutes, partici-
pants were asked to do a short memory task, which consisted in trying to 
memorize as many items as possible from a list of 60 nouns. After three minutes, 
the lists were taken away and the forms for writing down the nouns remembered 
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were distributed. After that, the experimenter gave participants feedback about 
the results on the memory task; depending on the condition, the feedback was 
positive, negative, or none at all. Positive feedback consisted in informing the 
participants about a “typical mean number of nouns remembered”; in the positive  
feedback condition, the “typical mean number” was largely underestimated 
(compared to the results from the pilot study), so that most participants had re-
sults above the mean number. In the negative feedback condition, the actual typi-
cal mean number was overestimated. No feedback was given in the control 
condition. 
Next, participants were asked to read the post-event material and, finally, 
they were given a memory test concerning the original material. At the end, all 
participants were debriefed. 
RESULTS 
The experiment was based on a 2 (misinformation: present vs. absent) × 3 
(reinforced self-affirmation vs. reinforced failure vs. control condition) design.  
A two-factor analysis of variance was applied to analyze the data. First, descrip-
tive statistics regarding the mean numbers of answers consistent with misinfor-
mation were computed and presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Mean Number of Answers Consistent With Misinformation 
Across Experimental Conditions  
Factor or interaction Level of factor N M SD 
95% CI
– lower 
bound 
95% CI
– upper 
bound 
Misinformation 
present 85 12.76 2.36 12.25 13.27 
absent 77 9.64 1.65 9.26 10.01 
Manipulation 
reinforcement 63 10.62 1.96 10.12 11.11 
absent 42 12.40 2.78 11.54 13.27 
failure 57 11.18 2.79 10.43 11.92 
Misinformation  
× manipulation 
present 
reinforcement 35 11.31 2.07 10.60 12.03 
absent 22 14.36 1.76 13.58 15.14 
failure 28 13.32 2.11 12.50 14.14 
absent 
reinforcement 28 9.75 1.43 9.20 10.30 
absent 20 10.25 1.97 9.33 11.17 
failure 29 9.10 1.50 8.53 9.67 
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Next, a between-groups two-factor ANOVA was performed. The main effect 
of the misinformation was significant (F(1,  156) = 127.17; p < .001;  2 = .45). 
Thus, the first hypothesis concerning the misinformation effect was confirmed. 
Also, the main effect of the self-affirmation and reinforced failure proved to be 
significant (F(1,  156) = 11.78; p < .001;  2 = .13). The HSD post-hoc Tukey test 
revealed that the participants from the reinforced self-affirmation group had a lo-
wer mean number of answers consistent with misinformation than the control 
group (p < .001), but the group with reinforced self-affirmation did not differ 
from the group with reinforced failure (p = .219). The latter had a lower mean 
number of answers consistent with misinformation than the control group  
(p < .001). 
The interaction between misinformation and self-affirmation was significant 
(F(1, 156) = 9.72; p < .001;  2 = .11). It is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Mean number of answers consistent with misinformation as a function of misinformation 
and self-affirmation manipulations. 
The planned comparisons analysis proved that in the misled group partici-
pants from the group with reinforced self-affirmation were less vulnerable to 
misinformation than the participants from the group with reinforced failure  
(F(1,  156) = 18.71; p < .001;  2 = .11), and from the control group (F(1,  156) = 
= 37.51; p < .001;  2 = .19). This last effect confirms Hypothesis 2. However, the 
participants from the reinforced failure group were more resistant to misinforma-
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tion than those from the control group (F(1,  156) = 4.00; p = .047;  2 = .02). This 
effect is the reverse of the one postulated in Hypothesis 3.  
In the case of non-misled participants, no significant differences between  
the groups with reinforced self-affirmation and the control group were detected  
(F(1,  156) = .87; p = .352;  2 = .01). Similarly, there were no significant diffe-
rences between the reinforced failure and reinforced self-affirmation groups  
(F(1,  156) = 1.78; p = .184;  2 = .01). The group with reinforced failure was less 
susceptible to misinformation than the control one (F(1,  156) = 4.65; p = .033;  
 
2
= .03). 
Finally, the difference between the misled and non-misled groups proved to 
be significant in the group with reinforced self-affirmation (F(1,  156) = 11.37;  
p < .001;  2 = .07), in the group with reinforced failure (F(1,  156) = 75.68;  
p < .001;  2 = .33), and in the group without feedback (F(1,  156) = 52.94;  
p < .001;  2 = .25). 
DISCUSSION 
In this experiment, two of the three hypotheses were confirmed. In the case 
of the third one, the result was statistically significant but the effect had the 
opposite direction than expected. First of all, the misinformation effect was repli-
cated. This effect is repeatedly replicated in most research (for a review, see Pol-
czyk, 2007). Its good replicability may suggest that the testimony of witnesses 
may be distorted in many cases. This is obviously relevant for any forensic con-
text, especially because eyewitness testimony remains a very important kind of 
evidence in contemporary courts (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006). It is therefore 
of vital importance to be aware of this effect and of ways to protect against it. 
As was mentioned in the Introduction, there are not many documented me-
thods of protecting against the misinformation effect. One of them is reinforced 
self-affirmation. In accordance with Hypothesis 2, it was confirmed that enhan-
cing a person’s self-confidence and self-esteem lessens vulnerability to misinfor-
mation. This confirms the existing findings (e.g., Szpitalak, 2012; Szpitalak & 
Polczyk, 2012a). It is worth stressing that in the present experiment different 
materials were used than in the previous ones, in which the original material was 
personally relevant for participants. In the present study, the original material 
was completely irrelevant for the subjects, as it concerned ancient history. 
Contrary to expectations, making participants recall their greatest failures in 
life and giving them negative feedback about the quality of their memory did not 
increase their susceptibility to misinformation. In contrast, as a result of these 
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manipulations they became less suggestible compared with the control group. 
The reduction of vulnerability to misinformation was less pronounced than in the 
group with reinforced self-affirmation, but remained significant when compared 
with the control group. 
There are various possible interpretations of this effect. First of all, the rein-
forced failure procedure might have activated negative self-image. The partici-
pants who remembered their failures were also given negative feedback about 
their memory. Carver, Blaney, and Scheier (1979) distinguish between two reac-
tions to a failure. The first one is passive defense of the Self and consists in 
withdrawing from activity, giving in, and reluctance to undertake further activity. 
The second one is active and involves increased efforts and will to overcome 
problems. It is possible that some of the participants in the present study chose 
the first reaction – they refused to engage in reading the post-event material, and 
thus, paradoxically, became less vulnerable to the misinformation included in it 
than the participants from the group in which no recalling of failures and no 
negative feedback took place. Put simply, if someone refused to read the post-
event material carefully, they may have overlooked the misinformation and may 
not have relied on it while doing the final memory test concerning the original 
material. 
It is also possible that some participants chose the second possible reaction to 
failure – that is, they engaged intensively in reading the post-event material in 
order to improve their results. But this may have resulted in becoming more 
aware of the discrepancies between the original and post-event materials. It is 
well known that such discrepancy detection reduces the tendency to answer in 
accordance with the misinformation (Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). Both 
these groups of participants – those restraining from reading the post-event mate-
rial and those becoming more aware of the discrepancies as a result of reading it 
intensively – may have contributed to the smaller misinformation effect in the 
group with reinforced failure. 
The procedure applied in the present study does not allow to draw a clear-cut 
conclusion on whether the mechanisms postulated above really took place and 
whether some of the participants were really aware of the discrepancies between 
the original and post-event materials. To determine this, a four-stage procedure 
akin to that devised by Blank (1998) or Polczyk (2007) would be needed. 
In the light of the present results, the reinforced failure effect does not seem 
to be a great danger from the perspective of applied forensic psychology. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, the witness may face a situation when their failu-
res will be obvious and receive some sort of negative feedback, too. This, 
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however, according to the present results, would not lead to increased tendency 
to rely on misinformation while giving testimony. Of course, the question of 
whether lowered self-esteem may cause other distortions of memory, apart from 
the misinformation effect, remains open (e.g., Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & 
Schacter, 2006).  
In sum, reinforced self-affirmation seems to be a promising basis for con-
structing methods of reducing vulnerability to misinformation applicable in 
forensic practice, even by the police. Developing such a method is the most 
important future direction in this research area. 
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